America’s Critical Minerals Race: Growing Battle for Scarce Resources

The United States is embarking on an ambitious effort to rebuild its strategic reserves of critical minerals. However, two major American stockpiling initiatives are now entering the same increasingly constrained global markets, raising the prospect that government-backed purchasing could intensify competition, drive up prices and make supplies even harder to obtain.

On 6 November, the Defense Logistics Agency announced that the Pentagon had committed US$2 billion towards purchasing critical minerals for the National Defense Stockpile. At almost exactly the same time, a separate American commercial reserve, known as Project Vault, was beginning to acquire materials from many of the same suppliers.

The two programmes are seeking everything from rare-earth magnets to tungsten, antimony and cobalt. They are not alone. Other American government agencies, together with Japan and the European Union, are also competing for access to increasingly limited supplies.

The problem is already becoming apparent. The Pentagon has been forced to cancel stockpile purchasing tenders for both cobalt and indium after failing to secure supplies on acceptable terms.

At the heart of this growing urgency lies China’s overwhelming influence over the critical minerals industry.

China occupies a dominant position in the global processing of numerous strategically important minerals. According to the International Energy Agency, it refines more than 90% of the world’s gallium, graphite, manganese and rare earths.

Since 2023, Beijing has progressively introduced export restrictions affecting gallium, graphite, tungsten and rare earth elements. Although the most sweeping rare-earth restrictions have been temporarily suspended, that pause is only due to last until 10 January 2027. Consequently, governments and manufacturers seeking to build reserves must consider the possibility that Chinese exports could once again be restricted.

China, meanwhile, has not been standing still. Its own state stockpiling agency has been actively acquiring strategic metals.

According to the US Geological Survey, China’s state reserve agency purchased 8,700 tonnes of cobalt metal in 2023, the largest annual quantity it had ever acquired. Reuters subsequently reported that Beijing intended to purchase as much as 15,000 tonnes during 2024. In March 2025, the Chinese authorities sought bids for additional cobalt, copper, nickel and lithium for their strategic reserves.

The scale of these purchases is particularly significant in a market where production is already concentrated in relatively few countries.

Consider tungsten. Global mine production amounted to approximately 85,000 tonnes in the previous year, of which China accounted for around 67,000 tonnes. Against a background of stronger demand and new export controls, tungsten prices increased sixfold between January 2025 and April 2026.

The underlying problem extends well beyond tungsten. US Geological Survey figures show that a single country often supplies the majority of global mine production for many of the minerals being targeted by the American reserves.

Demand is also accelerating. According to the International Energy Agency, consumption of copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths has increased by almost 10% annually on average. This compares with growth of approximately 1% for aluminium, lead and zinc.

Much of the additional demand comes from electric vehicles, battery storage systems, electricity grids and permanent magnets. Defence equipment, aerospace manufacturing and the enormous server infrastructure required by artificial intelligence data centres are adding further pressure.

The International Energy Agency has warned that the combination of concentrated supply and relatively small markets makes these commodities exceptionally sensitive to changes in purchasing patterns. Even modest shifts in supply or demand can have a disproportionate effect on prices.

The price differences between Chinese and overseas markets illustrate the problem. The agency found that European buyers were paying approximately five times the Chinese domestic price for gallium and heavy rare earths, while germanium cost roughly three times as much.